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Abstract
This paper analyzes how corruption affects the composition of public expenditures. First,
a two-stage rent-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting is derived that captures both
“political corruption” and “bureaucratic corruption”. The model illustrates how asym-
metries between industries in the degree of competition and in the difficulty of concealing
bribery may influence the allocation of public spending. The theoretical implications are
tested with a panel dataset for 26 OECD countries over the 1996 - 2008 period. The results
suggest that the shares of spending on health and environmental protection increase, while
the shares of spending on social protection and recreation, culture and religion decline
with higher levels of corruption. The significance of these distortions is robust to a variety
of specifications such as fixed effects, random effects, seemingly unrelated regressions, the
inclusion of additional controls, and the use of alternative corruption indicators.
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1 Introduction
The literature provides robust evidence that corruption is detrimental to the economic devel-
opment of a country. More specifically, empirical investigations suggest that an increase in
corruption by one standard deviation is associated with an 0.8 to 1.0 percentage point decline
in the GDP growth rate (Mauro, 1995; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). A recent study that
benefits from the availability of longer time series of corruption data even suggests a causal
link that runs from corruption to economic growth (Swaleheen, forthcoming).1 This causal
effect apparently relies on the following transmission channels: investments, trade openness,
and political stability (Me´on and Sekkat, 2005; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004).
Firstly, corruption reduces expected returns on investments through an increase in un-
certainty and the creation of additional costs. Higher levels of risk associated with returns
on investments are due to the difficulty of enforcing bribes (Boycko et al., 1996) and the fact
that bribery introduces the risk of being detected. On the other hand, corruption diminishes
returns on investments (even when ignoring the risk involved) because it acts as a tax. For
instance, when an entrepreneur in a developing country intends to start a business, he may
have to bribe a bureaucrat in order to obtain a mandatory business license.
Secondly, policy-makers are likely to create more barriers to trade than is socially opti-
mal since trade restrictions can be a substantial source of rents (Krueger, 1974). For instance,
a domestic monopolist has an incentive to pay bribes in order to be protected against for-
eign competition. Since free trade and international competition increase economic efficiency
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2006), such restrictions cause an impairment of economic growth
(Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). Thirdly, the perception that corrupted practices are pervasive
in the public sector fuels political discontent and causes instability and violence. Empirical
studies (Bardhan, 1997; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Mo, 2001) point out that such a climate of political
instability can be a serious obstacle to economic activity.
A fourth channel, which is relatively neglected in the existing literature, is corruption’s
distortionary effect on the allocation of public spending2. Given the growth in public expendi-
tures during the past few decades, this transmission channel has most likely gained importance
and therefore deserves more attention. The rationale behind a corruption-induced distortion
of the public budget is that bribe-maximizing politicians and/or bureaucrats prefer to shift
resources to areas with the best opportunities to be bribed. More specifically, they have an
incentive to increase the share of public expenditures that is spent on high-technology goods
produced in oligopolistic markets (Mauro, 1998), which ensures that bribery is difficult to
detect as prices are hardly comparable for innovative products and allows politicians and/or
bureaucrats to collect more generous bribes since large profits are at stake.
1In contrast, Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) assert that corruption has a positive impact on economic
development. However, these contributions ignore that bureaucratic inefficiency can be endogenous.
2For a short summary of the evidence for a link between corruption and public finances see Hillman (2004).
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In line with the fourth transmission channel, Gupta et al. (2001) provide evidence that
corruption stimulates military spending, while Mauro (1998) presents cross-sectional evidence
that corruption has a negative impact on education expenditures. The neglect of unobserved
heterogeneity in Mauro’s cross-country analysis may explain why he does not find a positive
association of corruption with defense expenditures in contrast to Gupta et al. (2001), while
the time dimension in Gupta et al.’s panel analysis is relatively short (1995 - 2001). Another
shortcoming is that both studies mostly rely on data from developing countries, which makes
it difficult to draw conclusions with regard to developed countries.
This paper first derives how a distortion in public spending arises in the context of
a two-stage rent-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting that captures both “political
corruption” and “bureaucratic corruption”. The model illustrates how the number of firms in
an industry (representing the degree of competition within an industry) and transaction costs
(representing the difficulty of concealing bribery) affect the allocation of public expenditures
and the willingness of a politician to make resources available to the rent-seeking contest.
To our knowledge, the distortion of public spending due to corruption has so far not been
addressed in any existing rent-seeking model in the literature.
The second part of this paper addresses the shortcomings of the aforementioned empirical
literature and analyzes the effect of corruption on the composition of public expenditures with
panel data for 26 OECD countries that reaches from 1996 to 2008.3 Even though the focus
on a specific group of countries reduces the heterogeneity in the dataset, the cross-country
variation in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is quite large.
To be exact, in the data used in this paper the CPI ranges from 0.4 (average for Denmark)
to 5.9 (average for Slovak Republic)4. As a third extension to existing studies, the regression
analysis includes all ten expenditure categories that are commonly provided instead of a priori
assuming that only one or two specific expenditure categories are affected.5
The empirical analysis suggests that an increase in the perceived level of corruption
induces a growth in the shares of spending on health and environmental protection, while
the shares of expenditures on social protection and recreation, culture and religion decline
with increasing corruption. The statistical significance of these effects is robust to a variety
of specifications such as fixed effects, random effects, seemingly unrelated regressions, the
inclusion of additional controls, and the use of alternative corruption indicators.
The analysis is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the role that non-competitive
market structures and high-technology play with regard to the existence of corruption in the
3Another reason why we focus on developed countries is that in contrast to the corresponding OECD
datasets the GFS data by the IMF on worldwide public expenditures is criticized for its lack of cross-country
comparability (Mauro, 1998). Australia, Mexico, Switzerland and Turkey are not included in our sample since
data on public expenditures is not available for these four OECD countries.
4The CPI scale from 0 to 10 has been inverted so that a higher value indicates a higher level of corruption.
5Dellavalade (2006) also includes several expenditure categories in her analysis, but focuses on a set of
developing countries over the 1996 - 2001 period.
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public sector. Section 3 outlines the theoretical background of the analysis in the context of
a two-stage rent-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting. Afterwards, section 4 describes
the dataset and the empirical strategy, while section 5 reports the results for the baseline
estimations and four robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes the analysis.
2 Market structure, technology, and public sector corruption
Governments spend the resources that are available to them in various ways. In some cases,
governments directly provide services such as education and fire protection. In other cases,
governments redistribute income from some members of society to others. In the following,
we focus on the kinds of public expenditures that arise when politicians or bureaucrats com-
mission firms in the private sector to provide the government with specific goods or services.
Examples can be found in the health sector, in the military sector, and with regard to waste
management. The objective in this section is to identify what factors make corruption more
likely when the government and the private sector interact in such a setting.
In her seminal contribution, Krueger (1974) points out the simple fact that the existence
of rents induces rent-seeking behavior.6 Hence, one way to assess where public sector cor-
ruption is most likely to occur is to analyze which types of public expenditures promise rents
to politicians and/or bureaucrats. Going one step further, it makes sense to analyze which
types of public expenditures promise the highest rents to politicians and/or bureaucrats.
One factor that is strongly related to the size of the rent, which the public official can
expect, is the market structure that potential bribers are facing (Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Since
the stakes for being awarded a public contract are much higher in a non-competitive than in
a competitive setting, a bribe-maximizing politician has an incentive to shift as much of the
public resources available to him to types of expenditures which are spent in non-competitive
markets (Mauro, 1998). Of course, there is a limit as to how large this distortion will get
since the politician wants to keep the probability of detection reasonably low. The impact
of the market structure on rent-seeking activities can also be extended to the international
sphere given the evidence that corruption prevails in countries where firms have low exposure
to foreign competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).
Due to high entry barriers one can well imagine that the above argument related to non-
competitive market structures applies especially to high-technology markets. Yet, there is also
another reason why public officials prefer to shift resources to types of expenditure that are
technology-intensive. The necessity of secrecy for an illegal act such as bribery implies that
corrupt politicians prefer to collect bribes on goods whose exact value cannot be ascertained
such as high-technology goods that are not too widely distributed (Mauro, 1998; Shleifer and
6Note that rent-seeking and corruption are related but not entirely congruent concepts. Lambsdorff (2002)
provides an overview of the use of rent-seeking models to describe corruption.
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Vishny, 1993). The fact that this is especially true for defense expenditures due to national
security reasons is pointed out by Hines (1995) who provides evidence that international trade
in military aircraft is particularly prone to corruption.
The bribe that an agent from the private sector is willing to pay in order to succeed in a
public invitation to tender increases proportionally with the profits that the briber earns with
the involved public project. This line of reasoning implies that corruption induces a shift of
public resources to expenditure types that are allocated to large projects (Bardhan, 1997).
Since the size of a project increases with the prices of the products bought, this argument
is again related to oligopolistic market structures and the fact that high-technology products
require large R&D investments. Tanzi and Davoodi’s (1997) finding that public resources are
shifted to investments in the building and creation of projects and away from operation and
maintenance lends some support to this hypothesis.
To conclude, the above considerations suggest that two main factors affect the likelihood
that corruption occurs. First, the number of bribers in an industry that try to induce a shift
public expenditures in their favor is negatively correlated with the likelihood that this shift
will occur. Second, it is more likely that corruption occurs in fields where it is easy to keep
bribery secret, i.e. where products involve high-technology and prices are difficult to ascertain.
The following section will integrate these considerations in a two-stage rent-seeking model to
illustrate how these two factors affect the composition of public spending. To do so, we divide
the private sector into different industries that may be commissioned by the government to
provide a good or a service. The government’s purchase of these goods and services in turn
gives rise to public expenditures in distinct expenditure categories.
3 A two-stage bribing contest with endogenous rent-setting
3.1 General framework
This section applies the two-stage rent-seeking framework by Katz and Tokatlidu (1996)
in the context of public sector corruption. The model is augmented by allowing for an
endogenous determination of the size of the rent in line with Appelbaum and Katz (1987).
The considerations from section 2 are integrated into this model by means of an asymmetry
in the number of firms nj ≥ 2 (representing the degree of competition) and an asymmetry in
the effectiveness of rent-seeking efforts βj7 (inversely related to the transaction costs involved
in keeping bribery secret) across two industries j = A,B. The objective is to illustrate how
these factors affect the share of the rent that the two industry groups are expected to gain.
This in turn sheds light on the question how the allocation of public expenditures is distorted.
7This relates for instance to the analysis by Stein (2002) on the implications of asymmetry in the ability
to convert expenditures into meaningful efforts.
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The model rests on the assumption that a politician has discretion over the allocation
of a budget G > 0 that is exogenously given. The politician can, however, determine what
share (1 − γ) of the public budget G he wants to make available to the rent-seeking contest
and therefore, he is a rent-setter. There are two industries denoted as j = A,B that consist
of nj firms and that pay bribes xij to the politician in order to win the rent S = (1− γ)G.
Given that the rent is divisible, each industry wins an expected share of the rent S which
represents a public good at this point. If the politician announces that he will allocate a large
share of the public budget G to the rent-seeking contest, he is likely to lose the election and
to receive neither any of the bribe income nor his salary in office y. Instead, he earns an
alternative compensation V < y.8 On the other hand, if the politician announces that a small
share of G will be allocated to the contest, he is more likely to win the election but he will
receive a smaller amount of bribe income when he is in office.
In the second stage, we do not presume that there is an endogenous sharing rule as in
Nitzan (1991). Instead, since the recipient of the bribe is now a different person (a bureaucrat)
who we assume to be independent from the politician, the second stage constitutes a separate
contest and the first-stage bribes by the individual firms are sunk. In this intra-industry
bribing contest, the expected share of the rent S represents a private good. Expenditures by
each of the firms in the second round are denoted by yij .
In sections 3.2 to 3.4, this model is solved recursively, i.e. the analysis starts out with
the second stage. The reason is that the individual firms anticipate in the first stage that they
will have to engage in a second-round contest where they have to incur additional expenses
in order to win their individual share of the rent.
3.2 Bureaucratic corruption: Bribing contest between firms
In the second stage, the firms in industries A and B compete for their individual share of the
rent S by paying bribes yij to a bureaucrat who has complete discretion over the allocation
of his fixed budget. His decision is based entirely on the relative amount of bribes that he
receives. More specifically, following Tullock (1980) the share of the rent S that firm i wins
is represented by:
pij =

yij
yj
if max
{
y1j , ..., ynjj
}
> 0
1
nj
else.
(3.1)
8At first sight, one is tempted to believe that the politician earns a lower wage when in office than when he
works in the private sector. However, there are several reasons why we make the opposite assumption. First,
one could interpret y and V as utility levels and argue that politicians gain an “ego-rent” from holding office.
Second, one has to take into account that successful election candidates are offered more lucrative employment
opportunities after their political career than candidates that never hold an office. Hence, y and V can be
interpreted as the present value of the candidate’s lifetime utility in the two scenarios.
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Since it has not been derived yet what share of S is allocated to the two industries, we solve
the optimization problem for the case where one of the groups wins the whole rent S in the
first stage. Consequently, firm i = 1, ..., nj in industry j = A,B solves:
Max piij = pijS − yij . (3.2)
Assuming a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, an interior solution and symmetric firms within each
industry, the size of the bribe that an individual firm pays to the bureaucrat and the sum of
bribes paid by an entire industry can be expressed as follows:
yij
∗ =
nj − 1
nj2
S, yj
∗ =
nj − 1
nj
S. (3.3)
We can infer from these equations that the optimal bribe paid by an individual firm decreases
with the number of firms since each firm expects to win a smaller share of the rent. Yet,
the sum of bribes paid by an industry increases with the number of firms. If we plug the
expression for the optimal bribe paid to the bureaucrat (equation 3.3) into the profit function
in equation 3.2, the expected profit of an individual firm is derived as:9
piij
∗ =
1
nj2
S. (3.4)
Note that the existence of a second-stage contest causes a waste of resources. If the bureaucrat
simply allocates the rent that is intended for a specific industry equally among the individual
firms, each firm would have an expected profit of piij∗ = 1nj S. However, we assume that the
firms mistrust each other and do not rely on the fact that the other firms will abstain from
bribing the bureaucrat.
In the case where industry A is characterized by an oligopolistic market structure,
whereas firms in industry B operate in a competitive market environment, it holds that
nA < nB, i.e. the number of contestants differs between the two industries. If nA < nB is
fulfilled, equation 3.4 predicts that the expected profit for firms in industry A is higher than
for firms in industry B, i.e. piiA∗ > piiB∗.10 If the valuation of firms in industry B for entering
the second round contest is comparatively lower, this is likely to have an influence on the
first-stage bidding behavior of this industry. This will be analyzed in the next section.
9Obviously, the share of the rent that an individual firm obtains (i.e. the value of the project(s) that the
firm has been assigned to) does not represent pure profits. However, in order to keep the model tractable we
have abstained from introducing an additional parameter that captures the profit margin.
10Note that the difference in expected profits between the two industries grows disproportionately with the
difference in group sizes nA and nB due to the squared term in the denominator.
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3.3 Political corruption: Bribing contest between industries
In the first stage of the contest, the politician decides what share of the rent S to allocate
to each of the two industries. His decision depends on the relative size of the bribes that
he receives from the two industries. When industry j collectively expends xj , the politician
receives βjxj with 0 < βj ≤ 1.
The parameter βj is introduced in order to reflect the fact that the transaction costs
involved in keeping the bribe payment secret may differ between the two industries. The
larger βj is, the lower are the transaction costs. In conclusion, the share of the rent S that
the firms in industry j = A,B obtain is represented by:
Pj =

βjxj
βjxj+β jx j
if max {xj , x j} > 0
1
2 else .
(3.5)
Even though the politician allocates S according to the relative size of the aggregate bribes
in each industry, each firm decides individually on the size of the bribe xij that is paid to
the politician. The profit that an individual firm can expect when entering the second round
of the contest is represented by piij∗ (see section 3.2). Based on these considerations, each of
the nj symmetric firms in industry j = A,B solves the following maximization problem:
Max Πij = Pjpiij∗ − xij . (3.6)
The first-order condition for this optimization problem can be written as follows:
βjβ j
∑
i=1
n j
xi jS −
(
βj
∑
i=1
nj
xij + β j
∑
i=1
n j
xi j
)2
nj
2 = 0. (3.7)
If we use the fact that the firms are symmetric within the two industries, we obtain:
n jβjβ jxi jS − (njβjxij + n jβ jxi j)2nj2 = 0. (3.8)
Further manipulation of equation 3.8 yields the following expression that describes the rela-
tionship between the total expenditures of the two industries in equilibrium:
xj
∗ = x j∗
n j
2
nj2
. (3.9)
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Finally, we combine equations 3.8 and 3.9 to obtain the equilibrium expenditures by industry
j. As the following expression shows, this amount depends on the number of firms in each
industry, the transaction costs in making a bribe payment, and the size of the total rent:
xj
∗ =
βjβ j
n j2(β j
nj2
n j2
+ βj)2
S. (3.10)
On the basis of equation 3.10, it is straightforward to derive the politician’s total bribe income
(βjxj∗ + β jx j∗), which we denote as R1:
R1 =
 β j
nj2(βj
n j2
nj2
+ β j)2
+
βj
n j2(β j
nj2
n2j
+ βj)2
βjβ jS. (3.11)
Equation 3.11 suggests that the larger the rent S is, the more bribe income is collected by
the politician. However, the influence of the number of firms and the size of transaction costs
is less obvious at this point (see section 3.4 for such comparative statics analyses).
3.4 Endogenous rent-setting
Following Appelbaum and Katz (1987), the politician is at the same time a rent-seeker and
a rent-setter. Therefore, the size of the rent is determined endogenously. More specifically,
the politician is torn between two objectives. He wants to be elected and earn a high salary
y, but on the other hand he also wants to collect a high bribe income R1.
Both of these objectives depend on what share (1 − γ) (with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) of the total
budget G he makes available to the rent-seeking contest (S = (1 − γ)G). When γ is large,
the rent S is small and following equation 3.11 the politician’s bribe income will be low. On
the other hand, a large γ increases the probability g that the politician wins the election and
receives a high salary. In summary, the politician faces the following objective function:
Max E[U ] = g(γ)(y +R1) + (1− g(γ))V. (3.12)
In order to allow for an explicit solution for equation 3.12, we assume g(γ) = γ. The max-
imization of equation 3.12 yields the following expression for the equilibrium share of the
budget G that is not allocated to the rent-seeking contest:
γ∗ =
1
2
+
y − V
2κG
with κ =
 β j
nj2(βj
n j2
nj2
+ β j)2
+
βj
n j2(β j
nj2
n2j
+ βj)2
βjβ j . (3.13)
8
Equation 3.13 shows that the politician makes less than half of the total budget G available
as a rent for the bribing contest under the assumption that y > V holds. In addition, since
γ∗ ≤ 1 has to be fulfilled, we know that G ≥ y−Vκ . Hence, the total budget has to be large
enough or conversely the salary gain from being elected into office should be moderate.
Based on equation 3.13, one can easily derive the following relationships:
∂γ∗
∂y
> 0,
∂γ∗
∂V
< 0, and
∂γ∗
∂G
< 0. (3.14)
Equation 3.14 suggests that the politician’s motivation to abstain from making public re-
sources available for the rent-seeking contest depends positively on the size of his salary when
in office y and negatively on his alternative wage V . This corresponds with the existing
evidence in the empirical (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) and experimental literature
(Schulze and Frank, 2003) for a negative relationship between the wage level in the public
sector (compared to the wage level in the private sector) and corruptibility.
Finally, the larger the overall budget G is, the higher is the potential bribe income of
the politician and the more public resources will he make available as a prize for the bribing
contest. This aspect is particularly noteworthy when considering the growth in public sector
size over the past few decades because it points out that distortions in the allocation of public
budgets have become more significant over time.
In addition to the relationships summarized in equation 3.14, one can derive how γ∗
is influenced by the number of firms and the size of the transaction costs in each industry
(complete derivations are provided in appendix A):
∂γ∗
∂βj
< 0,
∂γ∗
∂β j
< 0,
∂γ∗
∂nj
> 0 and
∂γ∗
∂n j
> 0. (3.15)
It follows from equation 3.15 that higher transaction costs (1 − βj or 1 − β j) associated
with concealing corruption induce the politician to allocate a smaller share (1− γ∗) of public
resources to the rent-seeking contest. Moreover, the politician reduces the amount of resources
available as a rent if the degree of competitiveness increases in the two industries, i.e. if the
number of firms increases. Both conclusions confirm the considerations in section 2.
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4 Data and model specification
4.1 Data description
The dependent variable in the estimations is one of ten expenditure types as a share of total
public expenditures taken from the OECD National Accounts database (see table 6 in the
appendix for a definition of these expenditure types). Even though the absolute amount of
public resources spent on purposes such as social protection is unlikely to be affected by
corruption in the way described in sections 2 and 3, we include these expenditure types in
the regression analysis since it is still possible that the relative shares are affected.
Corruption is the main explanatory variable in the empirical analysis and is measured
by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. This data is of
a subjective nature since the CPI relies on surveys among international business people, risk
analysts, local residents and expatriates. Figure 1 illustrates averages for the CPI from 1996
to 2008 for each of the 26 OECD countries. Obviously, corruption is lowest in Scandinavian
countries, whereas the most corrupt countries are mainly located in Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean region. The CPI averages exhibit a high cross-country variation with values
ranging from less than 1 until up to 6 on a scale from 0 to 10.
Figure 1: Corruption averages per country, 1996 - 2008
Source: Transparency International
While we are aware of the shortcomings of subjective indicators, using the CPI is justified.
First, objective data such as the number of corruption-related prosecutions may be rather
noisy with regard to an illegal act such as corruption and this data may only capture the
extent and effectiveness of anti-corruption law enforcement. Second, even though the different
surveys that are used in order to construct the CPI rely on different methodologies and
interview different people, they correlate strongly with each other (Lambsdorff, 2004a). This
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is not a trivial finding given that one might expect foreign experts to have different perceptions
of the incidence of corruption in a country than residents and local businessmen. Third,
Kaufmann et al. (2004) investigate the potential for biases in perceptions more specifically
and report that they do not find any significant ideological biases in corruption ratings.
Finally, it has been argued that the CPI allows for year-to-year comparisons even if the
sources used are not the same in each year. This is due to the fact that the effect of changes
in the sources on the CPI estimate is rather small (Lambsdorff, 2004b).
In order to accommodate the fact that demographic factors have a strong influence on the
composition of the public budget, we include the age-dependency ratio based on the OECD
Annual Labour Force Statistics (ALFS) in all the estimations. In addition, the regressions
control for population density since the provision of public goods should be cheaper in more
densely populated areas due to economies of scale. Moreover, we take into account the share
of the urban population in all estimations since preferences for the provision of public goods
and services are likely to differ between urban and rural areas. The data for both population-
related variables is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
In addition, we include the growth rate of real GDP as one of two economic variables
from the OECD databases in the regressions due to Wagner’s Law. According to this rule,
the public sector grows as a society becomes wealthier based on two arguments. Firstly, as
states grow wealthier they also grow more complex, increasing the need for public regulatory
action. Secondly and more importantly, certain publicly provided goods such as education
are luxury goods only provided when society reaches a certain level of wealth. In addition,
we include the unemployment rate given that the relative importance of social protection
expenditures in the public budget is likely to increase with high levels of unemployment.
The estimations also take into account several fiscal policy variables. First, we control
for government size (total expenditures divided by GDP). Second, the estimations include
gross financial liabilities of the general government as a share of GDP. A government that
faces high levels of debt is likely to temporarily cut expenditures in certain areas. Third, we
include the interest rate on government bonds as a catch-all measure for the fiscal situation
in a certain country. This has the advantage that we can capture government stability and
political risks. All three variables are taken from the OECD Annual National Accounts.
As the final group of control variables, we take into account three political/institutional
factors from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) by Beck et al. (2001) in one of the
robustness checks. First of all, we expect that left-wing governments allocate public resources
in a different way than right-wing governments, which has been illustrated in numerous em-
pirical studies (see for instance Bra¨uninger 2005; Van Dalen and Swank 1996). The second
political variable is the number of years left in the current term given the evidence for politi-
cal cycles in public expenditures in line with the theoretical prediction by Nordhaus (1975).
Finally, we include a measure of government fragmentation as the number of parties in a
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government coalition and their relative sizes are likely to affect how the budget is allocated
(for a more detailed definition of the political variables see table 7).11
Moreover, we use two alternative measures for corruption as a robustness check. The
first measure belongs to the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al, 2004).
While this measure is an aggregate indicator like the CPI, one of the main advantages is
that it uses more sources than the CPI. As a result, the World Bank corruption measure
captures corruption in the public as well as the private sector (some sources provide data on
corruption at the household level) as perceived by experts and opinion polls, while the CPI
measures public sector corruption as perceived by experts only. We do not use the World
Bank’s corruption measure in the baseline estimations because it has only been published
bi-annually prior to 2002. The second corruption measure that we use as a robustness check
is provided by the private risk-rating agency Political Risk Services, Inc. that publishes the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The advantage of the ICRG corruption measure is
that it is not a composite indicator and therefore year-to-year comparisons are more reliable.12
4.2 Empirical strategy
In addition to being affected by the extent of corruption and the control variables outlined
in the previous section, the budget composition in a country may also be directly influenced
by the budget composition in other countries. In line with Devereux et al. (2008), the policy
reaction function in this particular case can be expressed as follows:
Expshareit = Ri(Expshare−i,t−1, Zit). (4.1)
In equation 4.1 the term Expshareit represents the respective expenditure category, while
Expshare−i,t−1 captures the vector of expenditure shares in all other countries in the previous
period. Finally, Zit stands for all remaining factors that influence the budget composition
including the extent of corruption.
Since equation 4.1 cannot be estimated given the available degress of freedom, Devereux
et al. (2008) recommend to replace the vector Expshare−i,t−1 by weighted averages. As
weights ωij , we choose the inverse of the spatial distance between the capitals of the countries
in our sample, since countries are more likely to respond to fiscal policy changes in countries
that are closeby rather than geographically distant. Summarizing, we estimate the following
equation for each of the ten expenditure categories:
Expshareit = αi + βCorruptionit−1 + γ
∑
j 6=i
ωijExpsharejt−1 + δXit + νt + it, (4.2)
11For evidence on the relationship between fragmentation and fiscal policy see Ricciuti (2004) and Volkerink
and de Haan (2001).
12Summary statistics for all variables used in the estimations are provided in table 8 in appendix B.
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where the subscripts refer to a country i = 1, 2, ..., 26 and the respective time period t =
1996, 1997, ..., 2008 . it represents the normally distributed error term.
Corruptionit−1 measures the lag of perceived corruption in a country according to the
CPI index from Transparency International. We have chosen to lag this variable in order to
take into account potential endogeneity problems and to accomodate the fact that corruption
is unlikely to have an immediate effect on budgetary measures. Xit is a vector that includes
the age-dependency ratio, the share of the urban population, the growth rate of real GDP, and
the unemployment rate. All regressions include time dummies in order to control for common
exogenous shocks νt and an intercept αi in order to deal with unobserved hetereogeneity.
Moreover, hypothesis tests are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.
It is finally important to note that the spatially weighted expenditure shares also enter
the regressions with a lag. This is preferable from a theoretical perspective since fiscal policy
responses to changes in neighboring countries are likely to take time. From an econometric
perspective, it is additionally advantageous to lag this variable since the potential endogeneity
problem with regard to these averages is solved without relying on the use of instrumental
variables (Devereux et al., 2008).
The estimation results for the two-way fixed effects models are presented in section 5.1.
The baseline estimations are followed by four robustness checks (section 5.2) that involve
random effects, seemingly unrelated regressions, the inclusion of additional controls, and the
use of alternative corruption measures.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Baseline regressions
The results for the baseline estimations are summarized in table 1, where models 1a to 10a
differ with regard to the dependent variable and the respective spatially weighted expenditure
shares. To begin with, a higher level of corruption is associated with an increase in the share
of expenditures on health and environmental protection. On the other hand, the relative
importance of expenditures on social protection and recreation, culture and religion decreases.
When taking a closer look at the definitions of the expenditure categories (see table 6
in appendix B), it becomes clear why these effects correspond with the theoretical consid-
erations in sections 2 and 3. First of all, health products often involve high-technology and
are produced in oligopolistic markets (Robone and Zanardi, 2006). This makes prices less
transparent and therefore corrupt activities are likely. Second, there is anecdotal evidence on
corruption related to the multi-million dollar construction of waste incineration plants, while
such expenditures fall into the category of environmental protection.
13
One example of anecdocatal evidence is the Cologne incinerator project in Germany,
where allegedly US $13 million were paid in bribes during the construction of a US$ 500
million waste incineration plant (Transparency International, 2005). A second example is
the Naples waste management crisis that peaked in the summer of 2008 (Smoltczyk, 2008).
In this particular case, municipalities awarded expensive waste disposal contracts to shady
consortiums controlled by the local Mafia. After fourteen years and a total cost of $ 2 billion
none of the three waste incinerators were operational and the garbage piled up on the streets
of Naples. An alternative explanation for the observed positive correlation could be that
corruption represents a major obstacle to environmental protection as it helps companies to
circumvent laws and regulations (Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Pellegrini and Gerlagh,
2006; Woods, 2008). In the long run, this should lead to a deterioration in environmental
quality that creates a need for higher expenditures on environmental protection.
Since public spending on social protection merely represents redistributive transfers be-
tween different population groups that are unlikely to be influenced by bribe-paying firms,
the relative importance of this expenditure category decreases with corruption. This does
not necessarily imply that expenditures in this area are cut, but only that the relative share
significantly shrinks. In addition, public spending on recreation, culture and religion de-
creases as well relative to other expenditure categories, which is in line with the theoretical
considerations in sections 2 and 3 as they also provide very few opportunities for bribery.
The magnitudes of the coefficients for corruption in table 1 can be interpreted as follows:
An increase in perceived corruption leads ceteris paribus to an increase in expenditures on
health and environmental protection by 0.4 and 0.05 percentage points, respectively. In
addition, this change leads to a decrease in expenditures on social protection and recreation,
culture and religion by 0.3 and 0.04 percentage points.13 With regard to the control variables,
it can be stated that the ten expenditure categories are in most cases significantly affected
by demographic factors, fiscal policy shocks in neighboring countries, the economic situation
in a particular country and other fiscal policy variables (government size, government debt,
and interest rate on government bonds). In addition, the country and time fixed effects are
jointly significant at the 1% level, respectively.
To conclude, by focusing on developed countries and using a longer time series in addition
to panel-specific estimation techniques we observe corruption-induced changes in the relative
importance of expenditure categories that are quite different from those observed by Mauro
(1998) and Gupta et al. (2001). However, they are in line with our theoretical predictions
in sections 2 and 3. Apart from the fact that we use alternative estimation techniques and
other data sources, there is an additional reason why we obtain different results.
13Note that the effect on health and social protection expenditures is larger in terms of percentage point
changes since these categories are two of the largest shares of the total budget.
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In developing countries, a relative increase in the defense budget is more likely to be detected
by the press and the general public. The same is true when level of education spending
changes. In addition, since developing countries are usually characterized by a democratic
political system, politicians are more likely to be punished in upcoming elections if they
distort the composition of public expenditures in sensitive areas such as education and defense.
Therefore, the exact nature of the distortions that occur due to corruption are likely to depend
on the development status of a country.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Two-way fixed effects estimations only take into account the within-variation of the data.
Since existing investigations mostly rely on cross-sectional estimations and since the Hausman
test does not clearly indicate whether we should use random or fixed effects, we are now
investigating to what extent the results change with random effects.14 The key difference
is that in fixed effects estimations one assumes that the time-invariant characteristics of a
country are correlated with the explanatory variables, while in random effects estimations
they are not correlated. In table 2, we collect these additional estimation results.
The most interesting insight gained from table 2 is that with random effects the rela-
tionship between corruption and the composition of public expenditures is almost the same
as with country fixed effects. As in table 1 expenditures on health and environmental pro-
tection increase significantly, while expenditures on recreation, culture and religion decline
significantly. However, the coefficient for corruption in the model for social protection expen-
ditures is still negative but not significant with a t-statistic of -1.06. The magnitudes of the
coefficients also only change slightly and are quite robust compared to the results in table 1.
In addition, the coefficients for lagged corruption are in two cases more significant than in
table 1 (10% level). For environmental protection, the coefficient is now even significant at
the 5% level, while for recreation, culture and religion it is significant at the 1% level.
The second robustness check estimates the ten models in table 1 as a system rather than
estimating each equation separately. Since the ten expenditure categories sum up to a total
of 100%, the regressions for each of the categories are by definition not independent from
each other. In fact, when one of the shares decreases, we have the additional information that
at least one of the other shares must have increased. Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions (SUR) model makes use of this information. This particular estimation procedure
allows for an improvement in efficiency compared to estimating the ten models separately with
OLS. The results for this robustness check are summarized in table 3.
14We have chosen to conduct the baseline estimations and robustness checks II to IV with two-way fixed
effects since they are jointly significant at the 1% level. In addition, this allows us to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity and the existence of common exogenous shocks.
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While the coefficients for corruption in the previous period are significant and have the same
sign with regard to the models for social protection, health and environmental protection,
corruption has an insignificant effect on expenditures on recreation, culture and religion.
However, the t-statistic is still negative with t = −1.12. Hence, as with the first robustness
check we find confirmation of the significant results in table 1 in three out of four cases.
The third robustness check re-estimates the models in table 1 while adding three political
control variables. It should be noted that for the time period considered, there is no data
available for government ideology in the DPI with regard to the Slovak Republic. Therefore,
the number of countries included in the regressions drops to 25, while the total number of
observations drops from 273 to 268. The results for this robustness check are summarized in
table 4 and provide additional support for the findings in table 1. The coefficients for lagged
corruption have the same sign and significance as in table 1, except that in the model for
social protection expenditures (model 1d) the coefficient is now even significant at the 1%
level. Furthermore, the coefficients for government ideology and government fragmentation
are in most cases significant, while we find only weak evidence for political cycles in the
allocation of the public budget. More specifically, the estimation results suggest that left-
wing parties spend a higher share of the public budget on social protection and health, while
right-wing parties are likely to spend more on public order and safety. In addition, government
fragmentation has a significant influence on seven out of ten expenditure shares.
As a final robustness check, we have re-estimated the models for expenditures on social
protection, health, general public services, environmental protection and recreation, culture
and religion with two alternative corruption indicators. The analysis is limited to these five
models since the lagged corruption coefficient has not been significant in any of the other
five models in tables 1 to 4. Columns 2 to 6 in table 5 report the results for the estimations
that use the ICRG Corruption Index, while columns 7 to 11 refer to the estimations that
use the World Bank Corruption Indicator. Since the World Bank measure is only available
bi-annually prior to 2002, we have interpolated the values for 1997, 1999, and 2001. Moreover,
the estimations in columns 2 to 6 only cover the time period until 2006.
In the estimations that use the ICRG measure for corruption, we find that only the
shares of health expenditures and environmental protection are significantly influenced by
corruption. On the other hand, in the estimations that rely on the World Bank’s corruption
measure, there is evidence that the shares of social protection and recreation, culture, and
religion expenditures are significantly affected by corruption. The signs for these significant
corruption coefficients are in line with the results in table 1. To conclude, the results obtained
in table 1 do not rely on the use of one particular corruption indicator. Instead, they can be
roughly generalized with regard to all corruption measures that are commonly used in the
literature. More generally, the four robustness checks provide a strong confirmation of the
results obtained for the baseline estimations in table 1.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of corruption on the composition of public expenditures. The
theoretical part first derives how a distortion in public spending arises in the context of a
two-stage rent-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting that captures both “political cor-
ruption” and “bureaucratic corruption”. The model illustrates how the degree of competition
within an industry and the difficulty of concealing bribery affect the share of the rent that is
obtained by an industry and the willingness of a politician to make resources available to the
rent-seeking contest. The empirical investigation is based on a panel dataset for 26 OECD
countries covering the time period from 1996 to 2008. The results suggest that with an in-
crease in corruption the shares of spending on health and environmental protection increase,
while the shares of expenditures on social protection and recreation, culture and religion de-
cline. The significance of these distortions is robust to a variety of specifications such as fixed
effects, random effects, seemingly unrelated regressions, the inclusion of additional controls,
and the use of alternative corruption indicators.
The findings in this paper raise concerns about the wider implications of a distortion in
public expenditures. First of all, not only the distortion in the allocation of public resources
itself may cause inefficiency. In addition, bribe payments represent social waste as they are
spent to influence the allocation of an income that has already been earned (Hillman, 2009).
If one additionally assumes that bribe payments between politicians and bureaucrats occur as
in a multi-stage hierarchical contest framework, the extent of this social waste is even more
considerable (Hillman and Katz, 1987).
Second, a distortion in the allocation of public expenditures leads to a failure of the
government in fulfilling its objectives. For instance, due to an allocation of resources to
suppliers other than the most efficient suppliers, both the quantity and quality of public
provision will be less satisfactory. As a consequence, voters’ disenchantment with politics
may increase which means that more and more voters will be less interested in following the
news. More importantly, politicians will have even more freedom in distorting the allocation
of public resources. Hence, the problem feeds itself and public sector corruption is likely to
have more serious consequences in the future. To conclude, the results in this paper suggest
that the fight against corruption should rank high on the agenda of international institutions
and decision-makers and should not be limited to developing countries.
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Appendix A
Equations A.1 to A.4 summarize how the relationships in equation 3.15 have been derived.
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Appendix B
Table 6: Items included in OECD expenditure categories
Category Included items
Education (Pre-)primary, (post-)secondary, tertiary education incl. subsidiary services
Health Medical products & equipment, outpatient, hospital & public health services
Social protection Sickness, disability, old age, survivors, children, unemployment & housing
Defense Military defense, civil defense and foreign military aid
Public order & safety Police services, fire-protection services, law courts & prisons
Economic affairs Economic, commercial & labor affairs, agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting,
fuel, energy, mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, communication
General public services Executive & legislative organs, financial, fiscal & external affairs, basic
research, transfers between different levels of government, foreign economic
aid, general services & public debt transactions
Environmental protection Waste management, waste water management, pollution abatement,
biodiversity & landscape protection
Recreation, culture & religion Recreational & sporting services, broadcasting & publishing services,
cultural services, religious & other community services
Housing & community amenities Housing & community development, water supply & street lighting
Source: European Commission (2007)
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Table 7: Definitions and Sources of Variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Dependent variables
Expenditure shares Public expenditures divided into different categories Own calculations based on
(see table 6) as a share of total public expenditures OECD National Accounts
Explanatory variables
Corruption (CPI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on a reversed Transparency
scale from 0 (not corrupt at all) to 10 (very corrupt) International
Spatial lag of Weighted average of respective shares in t− 1, inverse
Own calculations
expenditure shares of distance between country capitals as weights
Government size Sum of public expenditures divided by GDP
Own calculations based on
OECD National Accounts
Government debt
Gross financial liabilities of the general
government as a share of GDP
Interest rate on
Interest rate on 10-year government bonds
OECD Economic
government bonds Outlook No. 86
Unemployment rate Standardized unemployment rates
Growth rate of
Growth rate of real GDP (PPP-adjusted and in US$) OECD National Accounts
real GDP
Age-dependency Sum of the population older than 65 yrs and younger
Own calculations based on
ratio than 15 yrs divided by working-age population
OECD Annual Labour
Force Statistics (ALFS)
Share of urban
Share of the population living in urban areas
population World Bank - World
Population Total population divided by surface area in square Development Indicators
density kilometers
Additional control variables (see table 4)
Government Categorical dummy (1 = right-wing, 2 = center, and
ideology 3 = left-wing)
Years left in Number of years left in the current term for the Database of Political
current term ruling government (0 indicates election year) Institutions (DPI)
Government Probability that two deputies picked at random from
fragmentation among the govt parties will be of different parties
Other corruption indicators (see table 5)
Corruption
ICRG Index for corruption as perceived by foreign
International Country
(ICRG)
investors on a reversed scale from 0 (least corrupt)
Risk Guide
to 6 (most corrupt)
Corruption Control of corruption measure on a reversed scale World Bank Governance
(World Bank) from -2.5 (least corrupt) to +2.5 (most corrupt) Indicators
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Table 8: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. dev. Observations
Corruption (CPIt−1) Overall 2.665 0.000 7.010 1.822 273
Between 0.396 6.440 1.978 26
Within 1.669 4.729 0.438 10.5
Government size Overall 44.484 20.807 63.032 7.529 273
Between 24.894 56.978 7.135 26
Within 39.802 53.343 1.925 10.5
Government debt Overall 65.414 5.623 175.274 32.352 273
Between 9.992 146.368 31.273 26
Within 19.501 94.320 9.254 10.5
Interest rate on Overall 5.083 1.003 12.798 1.674 273
government bonds Between 1.568 8.781 1.283 26
Within 2.201 10.270 1.157 10.5
Age-dependency ratio Overall 0.487 0.387 0.569 0.039 273
Between 0.396 0.547 0.041 26
Within 0.448 0.538 0.012 10.5
Population density Overall 154.231 2.768 490.793 140.023 273
Between 2.909 478.712 136.033 26
Within 136.625 169.457 3.933 10.5
Share of urban population Overall 74.922 51.760 97.340 10.989 273
Between 55.338 97.138 11.495 26
Within 70.519 78.739 0.918 10.5
Growth rate of real GDP Overall 3.225 -6.854 10.653 2.095 273
Between 1.195 7.655 1.539 26
Within -8.259 8.081 1.599 10.5
Unemployment rate Overall 6.676 2.007 19.643 3.260 273
Between 2.670 15.961 3.447 26
Within 0.317 12.605 1.388 10.5
Government ideology Overall 2.063 1 3 0.908 268
Between 1 3 0.600 25
Within 0.230 3.480 0.722 10.72
Years left in current term Overall 1.675 0 4 1.225 268
Between 0.500 2 0.316 25
Within -0.325 3.925 1.204 10.72
Government fragmentation Overall 0.283 0 0.828 0.256 268
Between 0 0.791 0.229 25
Within -0.154 0.577 0.106 10.72
Corruption (ICRGt−1) Overall 1.582 0 4 1.182 244
Between 0 3.969 1.158 26
Within -0.058 3.057 0.570 9.385
Corruption (WBt−1) Overall -1.558 -2.560 -0.206 0.663 257
Between -2.365 -0.281 0.720 26
Within -1.876 -1.173 0.111 9.885
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